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Abstract
The literature on staggered privatization sales suggests that governments can effectively signal commit-
ment to not expropriate the future rents of privatized firms. The privatization of telephone firms around
the world provides an excellent opportunity to test this theory. Using a sample of repeated privatization
sales I test whether governments can effectively signal commitment by selling ownership gradually and
transferring managerial control immediately. The use of panel data with fixed-effects provides consis-
tent estimates when commitment is not observed and time-invariant. Unobserved commitment is ren-
dered time-invariant by using repeated sales within a government administration, typically within two
years. The results cast doubt on the ability of governments to effectively signal commitment and in-
crease the market value of firms in privatization sales. These results hold for several signals tested.
Keywords: Privatization, signal, commitment.
JEL classifications: D7, D8, G12, L33
1. Introduction
Governments selling state-owned enterprises face the challenge of how to signal poten-
tial investors that they are committed to not expropriate the future firm’s profits. According
to Perotti (1995), in the presence of asymmetric information between the issuer of stock (a
government) and potential investors1,
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research support.“The structure of the sale may be used to reassure investors: a partial sale and
(possibly) its underpricing are signals of commitment. Gradual sales (with immedi-
ate transfer of control) imply that the government is willing to bear residual risk, a
signal that it does not intend to redistribute value through a future shift in policy”.
(Perotti, 1995: 848).
Several authors had tested Perotti’s predictions with various degrees of success.
These studies typically use data from privatization sales in several industries and in dif-
ferent countries spanning a period of ten to twenty years. Most studies find that under-
pricing is prevalent in privatization initial public offers (Perotti and Guney, 1993; Perot-
ti, 1995; Dewenter and Malatesta, 1997; Jones et al., 1999; Bel, 2002; Bel, 2003; Su,
2003; and Florio and Manzoni, 2004). A second finding is that the degree of underpric-
ing appears to be more pronounced in earlier sales (Perotti and Guney, 1993; Bel, 2002;
Bel, 2003; and Su, 2003). This is interpreted as supporting the hypothesis that govern-
ments build credibility (commitment) through time as suggested by Perotti and Guney
(1993) and Perotti (1995).
Contradictory evidence has been found on whether a small initial offer signals commit-
ment as suggested by the signalling hypothesis. Jones et al. (1999) find that small initial of-
fers leads to less underpricing which is consistent with Perotti’s (1995) signalling model.
However, Dewenter and Malatesta (1997), Bel (2002) and Bel (2003) find no effect on un-
derpricing suggesting that signalling is not effective. Moreover, contrary to the signalling
hypothesis, Su (2003) and Florio and Manzoni (2004) find that as the size of the share offer
increases underpricing falls2.
A common problem with several of the aforementioned studies is that they use proxy
variables to control for the unobserved commitment, but this creates an endogeneity prob-
lem due to unobservable characteristics that makes a government credible3. This in turn leads
to inconsistent coefficient estimates (see Wooldridge, 2002: chapter 5).
A second problem is that these studies typically regress underpricing on a set of ex-
planatory variables such as the size of the share offer, or the equity share retained by a gov-
ernment as if these were exogenous. According to Perotti (1995) both underpricing and the
size of the share offer are signals of commitment and therefore are choice variables. It
seems plausible to assume that the seller (a government) has a revenue target in mind; by
setting a price, implicitly a government is setting the quantity of shares to sell and the ex-
pected underpricing. Thus, a simultaneity problem exist producing inconsistent coefficient
estimates.
A third problem is that by using data spanning ten to twenty years these studies implic-
itly assume that credibility or commitment can be signalled by a country rather than a gov-
ernment. However, in Perotti (1995) governments signal commitment, not countries: “Be-
cause a government cannot commit future governments to its current policy, the model best
describes short- and medium-term policy uncertainty.” (Perotti, 1995: 850).
88 BRUNO VIANIThis paper departs from previous studies in several ways. First, its main focus is not to
find the determinants of underpricing; rather, it uses observed signals in privatization sales
and tests whether signalling was successful. A successful signal will reduce the risk of ex-
propriation and should increase the market value of a firm. Second, it uses a sample of pri-
vatization sales in a single regulated industry (telecommunications). This permits the use of
industry-specific variables to control for changes in the industry affecting the firm’s value.
The choice of industry seems appropriate because of the large amount of sunk costs and the
high risk of expropriation. Moreover, typically the sale of the government telephone monop-
olies represented the largest privatization sale in a country. Thus, successfully signalling
commitment was especially important. Third, and more important, commitment is treated as
unobservable strictly following Perotti (1995).
Empirically testing the signalling hypothesis is possible by following Levitt’s (1994) ap-
proach of pairing data in such a way that the unobserved variable (commitment) becomes
time-invariant and then using panel data with fixed-effects to estimate the relevant regres-
sions. For this end, only repeated privatization sales by a government are included in the
analysis4.
Finally, unlike previous studies (except Jones et al., 1999), potential endogeneity prob-
lems are addressed using suitable instruments and two-stage least squares estimation.
The results of panel data analysis with firm fixed-effects cast doubt on a government’s
ability to effectively signal commitment by manipulating the size of the share offer or by
timing the transfer of managerial control as suggested by Perotti and Guney (1993) and Per-
otti (1995)5. Section 2 discusses an econometric approach to overcome the fact that commit-
ment is not observed; then it specifies the hypotheses to test and describes the data. Section
3 implements the econometric tests and presents the results. Section 4 summarizes and dis-
cusses the results in light of its lack of support to the signalling hypothesis.
2. Empirical implementation
Assume for simplicity that each country has one telephone firm and a government sells
all its equity in this firm at time t1 and t2. Using Perotti’s (1995) framework, the value of
firm i sold at time t can be estimated using panel data analysis and the following population
model,
Vit = ci + Xita + b Signalit + g Commitit + ﾵit, (1)
where Vit is a vector of observations of the value of firm i sold at time t and ci is the time-
invariant unobserved heterogeneity of firm i including country specific regulations and in-
stitutions. As long as these are constant between t1 and t2 then they would be appropriately
captured in ci. Xit is a matrix containing observations of variables that affect the value of a
firm. Signalit is a vector of observations of the signalling variable chosen by a government
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.in the sale of firm i at time t. Commitit is an unobservable variable indicating whether a gov-
ernment selling firm i at time t is committed to not expropriate the firm’s profits, and ﾵit is
a vector of unobservable stochastic error terms.
According to Perotti (1995), a government can successfully signal commitment by manip-
ulating the size of the share offer at t1 or by combining a small share offer and the transfer of
managerial control in that sale. This in turn would increase Vit implying that b > 0 in (1).
A problem with equation (1) is that it cannot be estimated because government commit-
ment is not observed. One solution is to follow Levitt’s (1994) approach. By pairing the data
in such a way that the unobservable variable (Committit) becomes time invariant equation (1)
can be estimated using panel data with fixed-effects. For example, if the sample of privati-
zation sales only includes repeated sales, that is, sales by a same government, typically with-
in a two-year period, then all that is required to render Commitit time-invariant is to make the
plausible assumption that a government’s degree of commitment within an administration is
time-invariant6. A committed government will not expropriate while a not committed gov-
ernment will expropriate after the initial sale. By using only repeated privatization sales
equation (1) is transformed into,
Vit = ci + Xita + b Signalit + ﾵit, (2)
where the time-invariant unobservable variable Commitit is eliminated and incorporated into
the fixed-effect ci making equation (2) possible to estimate.
To qualify as repeated privatization sales two conditions must apply, (1) the chief exec-
utive (the president or prime minister) in the country selling firm i at time t1 and t2 must be
the same, and (2) the chief executive party’s control (or lack of control) of the legislature did
not change between t1 and t2.
Table 1 provides a summary of the sample of repeated privatization sales of telephone
firms. For simplicity only the first two sales are shown7. Notice that in all paired sales the
same chief executive was in office and no changes on the controlling party in the legislature
occurred. With no changes on political preferences, it seems plausible to assume that gov-
ernment commitment is time invariant. To further strengthen this point, notice in table 1 the
relatively short timeframe between repeated sales. The large majority of repeated sales oc-
curred within a two-year timeframe, short enough to regard commitment as constant. By
using repeated sales an unbiased test of the effectiveness of government’s signals on the
value of privatized firms can be performed.
The signalling hypothesis suggests first, that committed governments successfully sig-
nal their type by selling at t1 a small portion of the firm’s equity (Perotti 1995). Second, in
privatization initial public offers (IPOs) committed governments may signal their type by
underpricing the firm at t1. Third, committed governments enhance their signalling by trans-
ferring control of the firm at t1 in addition to selling a small share in that sale.
91 Can Governments signal commitment in privatization sales?According to Perotti (1995), committed governments will always signal and sell their
firms over time; it seems plausible to infer that all the repeated sales in the sample belong to
governments trying to signal commitment to increase the value of the firms.
A formal test of the implications in Perotti (1995) involves testing the following hy-
potheses.
– Hypothesis #1: The value of a firm increases when the first sale is accompanied by
the transfer of managerial control.
– Hypothesis #2: The value of a firm increases when the first equity offer is small.
– Hypothesis #3: When the first equity offer is small, the value of the firm increases
when the first sale is accompanied by the transferred of managerial control.
Each hypothesis tests the effectiveness of a different signal and implies that b>0 in
equation (2). For each signal the following null hypothesis is tested: H0: b<0.
Equation (2) is estimated using all the available observations of repeated sales. If the re-
gressors in (2) were all strictly exogenous ordinary least squares would produce consistent
estimates. As it will be discussed in more detail, the signalling variables are potentially en-
dogenous. Endogeneity may arise if past or current values of Vit are correlated with future or
current values of the signalling variables (Wooldridge, 2002: 265-7). For example, the cur-
rent value of Vit may affect a government’s choice of the size of the share offer. If govern-
ments target a certain amount of revenue from a sale and observe a fall on Vit before the sale,
they may increase the size of the share offer to achieve the targeted revenue. Similarly, past
values of Vit may affect the decision to relinquish control at t1 and thus an endogeneity prob-
lem arises. To overcome this, two-stage least squares is used. The choice of instruments is
discussed later.
2.1. Data
An original dataset containing 149 privatization sales of the dominant telephone firms
in 74 countries is used. These sales took place in the period 1984-2003. For each sale, data
is collected on the firm sold, date of sale, percentage of equity sold, type of sale (IPO, sea-
soned, private tender), and total sales revenue. The main sources for these data are Privati-
sation International (monthly) and the Privatisation International Yearbook (annual). Addi-
tional data on privatization sales are from the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency’s
database on privatization8 and from the Economist Intelligence Unit ViewsWire and Coun-
try Information online databases. For each firm, data on the type of telephone services pro-
vided (fixed local telephony, national long-distance, international service and mobile teleph-
ony) is also included. Data on whether the privatized firms were awarded monopoly rights
and the period over which these rights were guaranteed is also gathered. These data were
mainly collected from the Economist Intelligence Unit ViewsWire and Country Information
92 BRUNO VIANIonline databases, annual reports of these firms, regulator’s websites and from the Commis-
sion of the European Communities.
The firms in the sample are the dominant basic telephony providers9. In most cases,
by the time of the first sale they had nearly 100 percent market share on basic teleph-
ony. Most firms provide all three basic telephone services (fixed local telephony, long-
distance, and international service) and some are also licensed to provide mobile te-
lephony. Because the analysis uses only repeated sales, the original sample is reduced
to 67 sales in 27 countries. The sample of repeated sales includes two countries that
sold more than one firm (Argentina and India) and few governments that sold their
firms in more than two repeated sales (Finland, Greece, India, Israel, Japan, Mexico,
and Portugal).
Data on the government chief executive’s party and the party controlling the legislature
are from the Database of Political Institutions from Beck et al. (2001). Data on the chief ex-
ecutive’s identity is from Rulers.org10. Country level data on the economy, demographics,
and the telecommunications industry are from the World Bank’s World Development Indi-
cators and from the International Telecommunications Union’s World Telecommunications
Indicators online databases. Data on each country’s credit rating are from the Institutional
Investor’s monthly issues.
2.2. Econometric model
Equation (2) is estimated using panel data with firm-specific fixed-effects. The fixed-ef-
fect captures any time-invariant factor influencing the value of a firm. For example, it cap-
tures time-invariant regulations in telecommunications, a country’s institutions, and a gov-
ernment commitment not to expropriate.
The natural logarithm of the implied value of the firm per person is used as the depend-
ent variable Vit. Because all the share offers are for less than 100 percent, the implied value
is obtained by dividing the revenue raised by the size of the share offer (percent of the share
capital sold).
Matrix Xit includes demographic, industry, and other variables that affect the value of a
firm. Table 2 provides a list of variables along with definitions, summary statistics, and
sources.
Income is expected to be positively related to Vit because as income increases the de-
mand for telecommunication services should increase along with Vit. Two other variables are
included to control for the possible effect of age distribution on the demand for telecommu-
nication services. For example, countries with a large proportion of children may exhibit
lower demand for telecom services that an equally populated country with a larger propor-
tion of adults and elderly population.
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.The level of the NASDAQ index will affect the investor’s willingness to pay in a priva-
tization sale. The NASDAQ index provides a broad measure of market valuation of technol-
ogy and telecommunications firms. A positive relationship is expected between this index
and Vit.
Given that the privatized firms were the dominant fixed telephony providers in each
country, the number of mobile telephony subscribers per person should also affect Vit. To
some degree the entry of mobile telephone firms would erode the revenue of the privatized
firms and reduce Vit. However, increased mobile telephony use can also have a positive ef-
fect on Vit if it increases revenue through interconnection charges. The net effect on Vit is
ambiguous11.
The type of sale may also affect the market value of a firm. Privatization IPOs have been
found to be consistently underpriced (Perotti and Guney, 1993; Perotti, 1995; Dewenter and
Malatesta, 1997; Jones et al., 1999; Bel, 2002; Bel, 2003; Su, 2003; Florio and Mazoni,
2004). In addition, Bulow and Klemperer (1996) show that private tenders attract a limited
number of bidders and this also tends to depress the sales price12.
Therefore, seasoned offers are expected to be positively related to Vit and a binary vari-
able to control for this is included.
Changes on the licenses held by these firms will also affect Vit. For example, privatiza-
tion sales of telephone firms which included a period of monopoly significantly increase the
revenue from these sales (Wallsten, 2004; Viani, 2007). In addition, changes on the mobile
telephony licenses held by these firms will also affect Vit. For example, just few months be-
fore the second sale of Sonera in Finland, the government awarded a third generation mobile
telephony license (so- called 3G license) to Sonera free of charge while in other countries
these licenses have been awarded to the highest bidder13.
A binary variable is included to control for this and a positive relationship between this
variable and Vit is expected. No other changes on mobile telephony licenses were observed.
Finally, variables to control for the observance of law and order, and year binary vari-
ables to control for unobserved changes in the industry are included14. A high index of law
and order indicates a higher predictability of rules and this should be positively related to Vit.
The year binary variables may pick up changes in the industry not captured by the other ex-
planatory variables. In addition, several studies find that privatizations in the early years
were more underpriced than those in later years (Perotti and Guney, 1993; Bel, 2002; Bel,
2003; Su, 2003); the year binary variables may also capture this regularity.
Except for the number of mobile subscribers per person and the signalling variables,
the other right-hand variables seem strictly exogenous. A country’s number of mobile
subscribers per person would violate the strict exogeneity assumptions if past or current
values of Vit affect the current or future number of mobile subscribers per person. To see
96 BRUNO VIANIwhy this can happen consider this; in 1988, just few years before the privatization of
many large telephone firms, the waiting time for fixed lines in Ghana was 30 years, in
Argentina and Jamaica 22 years, and in Poland 12 years (Ambrose et al., 1990:13). The
long waiting time was a reflection of a relatively low Vit of the state-owned fixed line
providers at that time. Unable to raise enough revenue to serve the unmet demand for
telephone services, governments tried to remedy this situation by awarding mobile te-
lephony licenses to private firms. Therefore, the growth of mobile service in those coun-
tries was partially influenced by the low past Vit of the fixed line provider creating an en-
dogeneity problem15.
The signalling variables are also potentially endogenous. If the government budgetary
needs are an important consideration in the choice of the size of the share offer, then a low
value of Vit before the sale may induce a government to increase the size of the share offer
to raise enough revenue to satisfy these needs. For example, in Croatia, the initial plan to sell
Hrvatski Telekom (HT) called for the sale of 25 percent of equity with a revenue target of 1
billion dollars to finance the budget deficit. Fluctuating market conditions in 1999 made that
revenue target unlikely. In 1999 the Finance Minister, Boris Skegro, announced an increase
in the share offer to 35 percent of HT’s equity16.
In a similar way, the decision to transfer control in the initial offer can also be affected
by the value of Vit before the sale. A share offer carries more value to the buyer if it conveys
managerial control. Thus, a low Vit preceding a sale could prompt a government to transfer
managerial control in that sale17.
Two-stage least squares is used to estimate equation (2). Suitable instruments need to be
correlated with the endogenous regressor but uncorrelated with Vit. The degree of urbaniza-
tion seems a suitable instrument for the number of mobile subscribers per person. Urbaniza-
tion affects the cost of building a cellular telephone network. As the proportion of people liv-
ing in high density areas increase the amount of fixed investment per mobile subscriber
should fall18. A positive relationship is expected between urbanization and the number of
mobile subscribers per person. The first-stage regressions (see first specification in appendix
A) suggest that this instrument is suitable because its coefficient has the expected sign and
is highly significant. In addition, it is highly unlikely for urbanization to affect Vit once other
variables have been accounted for.
Three signalling variables are used to test the signalling hypothesis: (1) ControlFirst, a
binary variable that indicates whether at t1 a government transferred managerial control; (2)
Share25First, a binary variable that indicates whether at t1 a government sold a small por-
tion of the firm’s equity; and (3) Share33*ControlFirst, a binary variable that indicates
whether at t1 a government made a small share offer accompanied by the transfer of mana-
gerial control (see table 2 for definitions). The use of these variables implies that govern-
ments signal in the first sale only. Three alternative variables that allow for the possibility of
signalling at t1 or t2 are also tested. For this end the previous signalling variables are slight-
ly changed to: (1) Control, a binary variable that indicates whether managerial control was
97 Can Governments signal commitment in privatization sales?transferred at time t; (2) Share25, a binary variable indicating whether a government sold a
small share at time t; and (3) Share33*Control, a binary variable that indicates whether at
time t a government made a small share offer accompanied by the transfer of managerial
control (see table 2 for definitions). Having these two sets of signalling variables adds ro-
bustness to the tests performed.
The instrument used for these signalling variables is the country credit rating from
Institutional Investor. This rating measures how financially constrained is a government
and it has been used to assess the risk of default on sovereign debt (Reinhart et al.,
2003). I expect a lower credit rating to be associated with larger share offers or the trans-
fer of managerial control. A government in financial distress will experience an increase
on the cost of raising funds through debt. As issuing debt becomes increasingly expen-
sive, governments may decide to increase the amount of government assets to sell; that
is, the size of the share offer, or surrender managerial control to increase the sales pro-
ceeds19. The first-stage regressions indicate that this instrument has the expected sign
and is for the most part highly significant (see second, fourth, and sixth specification in
appendix A).
3. Results
We used equation (2) to test the three hypotheses from the previous section using one
signal at a time; the results follow.
3.1. Testing the effectiveness of signalling commitment by transferring managerial
control
Table 3 shows the results using two-stage least squares. Robust standard errors that ac-
count for heteroskedasticity are reported. Given that some firms were sold in more than two
tranches, the possibility of serial correlation in the model’s error terms within clusters (firms)
was investigated. I used Wooldridge (2002:282-3) and Drukker’s (2003) procedure and
found no evidence of first-order serial correlation within clusters.
The results indicate that the signalling variable (ControlFirst) is not statistically signif-
icant. The null hypothesis H0 cannot be rejected suggesting that governments cannot effec-
tively signal commitment by transferring control in the initial sale (first and second specifi-
cations in table 3). A similar conclusion is reached using the alternative signalling variable
(Control) which allows for signalling at t1 or t2. Again it suggests that governments cannot
effectively signal commitment by transferring control in a sale. These results do not appear
to be driven by the use of weak instruments. Appendix A (first and second specifications)
report the results of the first-stage regressions. As expected, a low country credit rating sig-
nificantly increases the likelihood of signalling and urbanization significantly increases the
availability of mobile telephony.
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TESTING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SIGNALLING BY GIVING UP CONTROL
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
ControlFirst –0.306 0.561
(0.13) (0.37)
Control 0.258 –0.800
(0.13) (0.37)
Log Income 5.389 5.828 4.240 6.784
(1.26) (1.68)** (0.63) (1.30)***
Log NASDAQ 0.613 0.66 20.385 1.077
(0.77) (0.98) (0.35) (0.62)
Monopoly 0.768 0.608 1.112 0.484
(0.57) (0.75) (0.76) (0.43)
Pop 15-64 0.341 0.386 0.227 0.466
(0.72) (1.20) (0.50) (0.88)
Pop 65+ –0.377 –0.240 –0.604 –0.350
(0.27) (0.25) (0.90) (0.49)
Law & order 0.199 0.148 0.313 0.103
(0.45) (0.51) (0.56) (0.27)
Free 3G license 0.959 0.868 1.128 0.890
(1.43)*** (1.98)** (1.31)*** (2.15)*
Log Mobile subs/pop 0.170 –0.047 0.682 –0.342
(0.08) (0.03) (0.34) (0.16)
Seasoned offer 0.045 –0.222
(0.15) (0.23)
Constant –31.374 –37.237 –17.759 –44.620
(0.55) (1.01) (0.33) (0.79)
Observations 61 61 61 61
Number of firms 26 26 26 26
Year dummies yes yes yes yes
p-value Hausman testa 0.445 0.214 0.460 0.043
Absolute value of t statistics in parenthesis. *=95% confidence level or more, **=90% confidence level, ***=80%
confidence level. Panel data regressions with firm fixed-effect and year dummy variables. Estimation is by two-
stage least squares. Robust standard errors. Dependent variable = Log Value/pop. Instrumented variables are the
government signal (ControlFirst and Control), and Log Mobile subs/pop. Instruments are: Urban and Country cred-
it rating.
a H0: All instrumented variables are exogenous. P-value is the probability of rejecting exogeneity incorrectly.
A Hausman test is implemented to determine whether the instrumented variables should
be regarded as endogenous (Hausman, 1978; 1983). The hypothesis that these are exogenous
is rejected with 78 percent confidence using the second specification and with 96 percent
confidence using the fourth specification (see last row in table 3).
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income and receiving a free third generation wireless telephony license, they lack signifi-
cance. The results seem fairly stable across specifications.
Testing the robustness of results
A set of tests are performed to assess how robust are these results. A binary variable in-
dicating the existence of a market-oriented government at the time of the first sale is used as
an instrument instead of the country credit rating. A market-oriented government is expect-
ed to be more likely to give up managerial control than centre or left leaning governments.
The rationale behind this is that a market-oriented government will be more inclined to do
this for ideological reasons. Market-oriented governments are typically more concerned
about economic efficiency than centre or left leaning governments. From the Database of Po-
litical Institutions (Beck et al., 2001), a binary variable is created which takes the value of
one if a government’s chief executive (president or prime minister) is categorized as right-
wing (market-oriented) and zero otherwise. Using this instrument does not change the results
(not reported). Again the coefficients of the signalling variables (ControlFirst and Control)
are not significant in all specifications.
An alternative instrument for the number of mobile subscribers per person is tested. Instead
of the degree of urbanization the number of vehicles per inhabitant was used. This should be
correlated with mobiles subscribership and uncorrelated with the value of the firm. The results
are unchanged; the coefficients of the signalling variables are not significant (not reported).
Adding the annual growth rate of gross domestic product to the specifications in table 3
leaves the main conclusion unchanged. A similar result is obtained when eliminating the
year dummy variables (not reported).
Finally, one may conjecture that committed governments may not need to signal com-
mitment20. If market-oriented governments are committed to no expropriation, then the
transfer of managerial control may not be a signal for these types of governments, but just
an expression of their desired to maximize revenue from the sale. If this is the case the re-
sults may be confounding signals with non-signals. To eliminate this possibility, those sales
in which the government was characterized as market-oriented (see table 2 for definition)
were excluded (we are assuming these governments were not signalling) and the equations
in table 3 were re-estimated. The main result is unchanged; the coefficients of the signalling
variables are not significant.
3.2. Testing the effectiveness of signalling commitment by selling a small equity share
Thesignallinghypothesissuggeststhatgovernmentscansellasmallequityshareinthefirst
sale to indicate that they are willing to share the cost of a future expropriation. Again, equation
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pendent variable. The signalling variable is a binary variable (Share25First) that takes the value
of one if the sale is the first repeated sale and the share offer is equal or less than 25 percent of
the firm’s equity (see table 2). Again, an alternative signalling variable is tested that allows for
signalling in any sale. Share25 is a binary variable that takes the value of one if on sale at time
t the share offer is equal or less than 25 percent of the firm’s equity (see table 2). The threshold
of 25 percent was chosen because it is a relatively small offer and it provides enough variabili-
ty across the sample of repeated sales. Different thresholds are tested later.
Table 4
TESTING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SIGNALLING BY SELLING A SMALL
EQUITY SHARE
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Share25First 0.050 0.310
(0.13) (0.37)
Share25 -0.098 -0.482
(0.13) (0.37)
Log Income 4.833 4.689 4.762 4.376
(1.47)*** (1.38)*** (1.34)*** (1.14)
Log NASDAQ 0.560 0.594 0.521 0.391
(1.27) (1.13) (1.73)** (1.07)
Monopoly 0.939 0.835 0.961 0.970
(2.83)* (2.18)* (2.42)* (2.17)*
Pop15-64 0.287 0.293 0.282 0.269
(2.15)* (2.12)* (2.17)* (2.01)*
Pop 65+ -0.533 -0.491 -0.569 -0.677
(1.10) (1.01) (1.10) (1.18)
Law & order 0.255 0.223 0.259 0.247
(1.12) (0.96) (1.10) (0.99)
Free 3G license 1.062 1.022 1.042 0.933
(2.36)* (2.26)* (2.72)* (2.37)*
Log Mobile subs/pop 0.430 0.423 0.467 0.605
(1.38)*** (1.39)*** (1.10) (1.13)
Seasoned offer 0.279 0.211
(0.61) (0.69)
Constant -26.432 -24.851 -23.337 -19.507
(2.44)* (2.31)* (1.71)** (1.17)
Observations 61 61 61 61
Number of firms 26 26 26 26
Year dummies yes yes yes yes
p-value Hausman testa 0.535 0.511 0.764 0.702
Absolute value of t statistics in parenthesis. *=95% confidence level or more, **=90% confidence level, ***=80%
confidence level. Panel data regressions with firm fixed-effect and year dummy variables. Estimation is by two-stage
leastsquares. Robuststandarderrors. Dependentvariable=LogValue/pop.Instrumentedvariablesarethegovernment
signal (Share25First and Share25), and Log Mobile subs/pop. Instruments are: Urban and Country credit rating.
a H0: All instrumented variables are exogenous. P-value is the probability of rejecting exogeneity incorrectly.
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ity. Again, the possibility of serial correlation in the model’s error terms within clusters
(firms) was investigated. Using Wooldridge (2002: 282-3) and Drukker’s (2003) no evi-
dence of first-order serial correlation was found.
Both of the signalling variables tested (Share25First and Share25) are not significant.
The null hypothesis H0 cannot be rejected casting doubt on the ability of governments to ef-
fectively signal commitment by selling small share offers. Again, it is unlikely that these re-
sults are influenced by the use of a relatively weak instrument (the country credit rating).
Using Share25 as the signalling variable, the first-stage coefficient of the country credit rat-
ing (the instrument) has the expected sign and is significant with 80 percent confidence (see
the fourth specification in appendix A).
Again, a Hausman test is implemented (Hausman, 1978; 1983). The hypothesis that the
instrumented variables are exogenous cannot be rejected (see last row in table 4).
The other variable coefficients have for the most part the expected sign. Income, monop-
oly, and a free third generation wireless telephony license significantly increase the value of
a firm. The results seem fairly stable across specifications.
Testing the robustness of results
Several tests are performed to assess how robust are these results. Adding the country
credit rating squared as an additional instrument does not change the main conclusions (not
reported). Again, the null hypothesis H0 cannot be rejected meaning that governments can-
not increase the value of the firm by using these signals.
The number of vehicles per inhabitant is used as an alternative instrument for the num-
ber of mobile subscribers per person. The results are unchanged; the coefficients of the sig-
nalling variables are not significant (not reported).
I also tested the threshold in the signalling variables for robustness. Reducing this
threshold to 15 percent does not alter the main conclusions. The new signalling variables
(Share15First and Share15) lack significance indicating again that governments are unable
to increase the value of the firm by using these signals (not reported).
Adding the annual growth rate of gross domestic product to the specifications in table 4
does not alter the main conclusion using all three specifications. A similar result is obtained
when eliminating the year dummy variables (not reported).
Finally, it may be plausible to question the endogeneity assumption of the signalling
variables (Share25First and Share25); especially in IPO privatizations when the size of the
share offer is fixed in advance21. The relatively high p-values obtained in the Hausman test
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table 4 were estimates using ordinary least squares. The main results do not change; the null
hypothesis cannot be rejected indicating that governments are unable to increase the value
of a firm by using these signals (not reported).
3.3. Testing the effectiveness of signalling commitment by selling a small equity share
and transferring control in a sale
A third signalling device suggested in the literature is that governments can sell a small eq-
uity share in the first sale and transfer managerial control immediately to signal commitment.
Again, equation (2) is estimated with the natural logarithm of the implied value of the firm per
person as the dependent variable. The signalling variable is a binary variable that takes the
value of one if the sale is the first repeated sale, the share offer was equal or less than 33 per-
cent of the firm’s equity, and the government transferred control in that sale (see table 2). In-
creasing the threshold to 33 percent was necessary because there is little variation in this vari-
able and for lower thresholds the variation was even less. This variable takes the value of one
in only four observations out of 61. The choice of the threshold is tested later for robustness.
Table 5 shows the results using robust standard errors that account for heteroskedastic-
ity. Again, no evidence of first-order serial correlation within clusters was found. The sig-
nalling variable (Share33*ControlFirst) again is not statistically significant meaning that
governments were unable to use this signal to increase the firm’s value. Like before, a sec-
ond signalling variable is tested to allow for signalling in any sale. This time the binary sig-
nalling variable takes the value of one if at time t the share offer is equal or smaller than 33
percent and the sale involves a transfer of managerial control (Share33*Control). Again, the
null hypothesis cannot be rejected. These results are unlikely to be influenced by the use of
weak instruments. The first-stage regression coefficients of these instruments have the ex-
pected sign and are statistically significant when using Share33*Control as the signalling
variable (see the fifth and sixth specifications in appendix A).
Again a Hausman test is implemented (Hausman, 1978; 1983). The hypothesis that the
instrumented variables are exogenous cannot be rejected.
Theothervariableshaveforthemostparttheexpectedsign;income,monopoly,andthefree
award of a third generation wireless telephony license significantly increase the value of a firm.
Testing the robustness of results
Several tests are performed to assess the robustness of these results. A binary variable
denoting a market-oriented government is used as an instrument instead of the country cred-
it rating. For ideological reason a market-oriented government would be more likely to trans-
fer managerial control than a left or centre leaning government. Using this instrument does
not change the results (not reported).
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TESTING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SIGNALLING BY SELLING A SMALL EQUITY
SHARE AND TRANSFERRING CONTROL
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Share33*ControlFirst 3.013 –1.091
(0.13) (0.37)
Share33*Control 0.302 –0.751
(0.13) (0.37)
Log Income 1.247 6.171 4.282 6.299
(0.04) (1.55)*** (0.66) (1.49)***
Log NASDAQ –0.018 0.761 0.420 0.888
(0.00) (0.83) (0.49) (0.71)
Monopoly 1.633 0.715 0.989 0.885
(0.29) (1.25) (1.80)** (2.41)*
Pop 15-64 0.398 0.245 0.285 0.287
(0.43) (1.56)*** (2.18)* (2.14)*
Pop 65+ –2.385 0.126 –0.702 –0.144
(0.16) (0.07) (0.53) (0.12)
Law & order 0.488 0.180 0.293 0.184
(0.25) (0.72) (0.69) (0.75)
Free 3G license 1.663 0.855 1.131 0.917
(0.33) (1.88)** (1.28) (2.31)*
Log Mobile subs/pop 2.037 –0.150 0.626 –0.051
(0.16) (0.09) (0.40) (0.04)
Seasoned offer –0.074 –0.189
(0.13) (0.22)
Constant 1.225 –33.574 –20.593 –33.573
(0.01) (1.22) (0.65) (1.22)
Observations 61 61 61 61
Number of firms 26 26 26 26
Year dummies yes yes yes yes
p-value Hausman testa 0.850 0.757 0.800 0.518
Absolute value of t statistics in parenthesis. *=95% confidence level or more, **=90% confidence level, ***=80%
confidence level. Panel data regressions with firm fixed-effect and year dummy variables. Estimation is by two-
stage least squares. Robust standard errors. Dependent variable = Log Value/pop. Instrumented variables are the
government signal (Share33*ControlFirst and Share33*Control), and Log Mobile subs/pop. Instruments are: Urban
and Country credit rating.
a H0: All instrumented variables are exogenous. P-value is the probability of rejecting exogeneity incorrectly.
The number of vehicles per inhabitant is used as an alternative instrument for the num-
ber of mobile subscribers per person. The results are unchanged; the coefficients of the sig-
nalling variables are not significant (not reported).
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alter the main conclusion. The new signalling variable lacks significance indicating that gov-
ernments are unable to increase the value of the firm by signalling (not reported).
Adding the growth rate of gross domestic product to the specifications in table 5 does
not alter the main conclusion. A similar result is obtained when eliminating the year dummy
variables (not reported).
Another test originates if one questions the endogeneity assumption of the signalling
variables (Share33*ControlFirst and Share33*Control); especially in IPO privatizations
when the size of the share offer is fixed in advance. The relatively high p-values of the
Hausman test supports this conjecture. Assuming the signals are exogenous, the equations
in table 5 were estimated using ordinary least squares. The main results do not change;
again the signalling variables lack significance (not reported).
Finally, one may conjecture that committed governments may not need to signal com-
mitment22. If market-oriented governments are committed to no expropriation, then the
transfer of managerial control (with the sale of a small equity share) may not be a signal for
these types of governments, but just an expression of their desired to maximize the firm’s
value in the sale. If this is the case the results may be confounding signals with non-signals.
To eliminate this possibility, those sales in which the government was characterized as mar-
ket-oriented (see table 2 for definition) were excluded (we are assuming these governments
were not signalling) and the equations in table 5 were re-estimated. The main result is un-
changed; the coefficients of the signalling variables are not significant.
4. Conclusions and discussion
The sale of the large state-owned telephone monopolies was typically the largest priva-
tization sale in a country. For example, in 1994 the government of Peru raised the equiva-
lent of ten percent of the national debt by selling 35 percent of the equity in two telephone
monopolies. This, along with the large sunk costs and regulatory uncertainty make these
sales especially suitable to test the signalling hypothesis.
The use of repeated sales by a same administration permits the estimation of consistent
coefficients when commitment is unobserved. This is because unobserved commitment is
time-invariant and captured as a fixed effect in the panel data regression models. Repeated
sales were typically undertaken within a two-year period with no visible changes in the ma-
jority in the legislature, and with no changes on the chief executive (president or prime min-
ister). In such a narrow time frame within a politically stable environment, unobserved com-
mitment is plausibly regarded as constant.
The results of panel data estimation with fixed effects suggests that governments are un-
able to successfully signal commitment (and increase the value of a firm) by using three
105 Can Governments signal commitment in privatization sales?common signals suggested in the literature. These results hold with alternative signalling
variables, instruments, and specifications.
The lack of support to the signalling hypothesis begs some explanation. A key assump-
tion in the signalling hypothesis is that committed governments care about maximizing the
value of the firms privatized. Committed governments are treated as value maximizing share
holders. In reality elected officials have a multiplicity of factors they care about and value
maximization of partially or fully-owned state enterprises may not be salient. Value maxi-
mization cannot explain why after the partial sale of state-owned telephone firms, govern-
ments continued to subsidize the prices of residential telephone services (or rural telephony)
with this subsidy being paid by business users. This however, should not obscure the fact
that committed governments would like to signal that they are committed and in fact try to
do so in many ways. Unfortunately, some ways of signalling commitment such as having in-
stitutions that protect private property and the enforceability of contracts are long term de-
velopments that cannot be addressed by a single administration. Moreover, the time horizon
for investors in these industries far exceeds the possible duration of an administration. In
these cases, institutions that remain once the administrations are gone (captured as fixed ef-
fects) may be far more important than the signals suggested in the literature.
Notas
1. The issuer knows whether it is committed to not expropriate a firm’s profits but this cannot be observed by
potential investors.
2. Florio and Manzoni (2004) used the equity share retained by the government and insiders.
3. Some proxies include a dummy variable to control for sales after a certain year, the order of each sale within
a country’s privatization program, and an index of economic freedom. The rationale for using these proxies is
that countries build credibility through time and that economically freer countries tend to be more credible.
4. Repeated sales may include private tenders, initial public offers, and seasoned public offers. In a private ten-
der a government announces the sale of part of its equity share in a state-owned enterprise and specifies the
terms of the tender offer. After this, each firm submits a technical proposal along with projections of telephone
network expansion, quality of service indicators, and any other projection required by the government. The
qualifying bidders then enter the final stage in which a block of shares is awarded to the highest bidder. Pub-
lic share offers are different because the government sells a given amount of shares using underwriters to place
a fixed amount of shares at a fixed price using the stock market.
5. Note that the signalling hypothesis tested refer to ex-ante signals when commitment is not observed. This is
entirely different than the argument advanced by Perotti and van Oijen (2001) where commitment is observed
through time by sustained sales of government enterprises. In that case commitment is observed ex-post by
government actions.
6. For example during Carlos Menem administrations in Argentina, the degree of commitment to not expropri-
ate is assumed constant. However, commitment is not assumed constant across two different administrations;
that is, between Carlos Menem and his successor Fernando de la Rua.
7. Some governments sold these firms in more than two sales. The regression analysis uses all available obser-
vations of repeated sales.
8. Available at http://www.fdi.net/
106 BRUNO VIANI9. Basic telephone services are defined as: local fixed line service, long-distance, and international service. The
firms were the traditional state-owned telephone monopolies.
10. http://www.rulers.org. Retrieved on February 21, 2007.
11. Some studies have shown some degree of substitution between mobile and fixed telephony (Gruber and Ver-
boven, 2001; Sung and Lee, 2002), yet others show these services as complements (Gruber and Verboven,
2001a).
12. See also Ernst & Young (1994: 109): “A negotiated sale usually results in the lowest price paid, because of
the lack of competition”.
13. See Selian (2001: 50).
14. Due to the reduced degrees of freedom, dummy variables for each year cannot be used; instead I used dummy
variables to control for sales that occurred in the first half and second half of each decade. For example, a
dummy variable called Early 1990s will take the value of one in sales that took place in the period 1990-94
and zero in sales that took place in a different period. In a similar way, a dummy variable called Late 1990s
will take the value of one in sales that took place in the period 1995-2000 and zero otherwise. See Wallsten
(2004) for a similar approach.
15. The reasons why the state-owned telephone firms were unable to raise funds to meet the growing demand for
service has been documented elsewhere. See for example Ramamurti (1996) and World Bank (1995).
16. See Economist Intelligence Unit, EIU Viewswire. Croatia: Business: Corporate Strategy: “Telecoms monop-
oly prepares for privatization.” (June 9, 1999). See also, Economist Intelligence Unit, EIU Viewswire. Croat-
ia: Business: Corporate Strategy: “State finds a German buyer for HT”. (October, 6, 1999).
17. Governments did this in several sales by separating cash flow rights from control rights.
18. See for example Hills and Yeh (1999).
19. Indeed, Ramamurti (1992) argues that one of the main drivers for privatizations was that governments were
financially constrained, especially in less developed countries.
20. See Perotti (1995). I thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
21. I thank you an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.
22. See Perotti (1995). I thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
References
Ambrose,W.W.;Hennemeyer,P.R.andChapon,J.-P(1990),“PrivatizingTelecommunicationsSystems.
International Financial Corporation”. Discussion Paper, No. 10. (Washington, DC: The World Bank).
Beck, T.; Clarke, G.; Groff, A.; Keefer, P. and Walsh, P. (2001), “New Tools in Comparative Political
Economy: The Database of Political Institutions”. World Bank Economic Review, 15(1): 165-176.
Bel, G. (2002), “Privatization: Public offerings and political objectives”. Applied Economics, vol. 34:
1421-1432.
Bel, G. (2003), “Confidence Building and Politics in Privatization: Some Evidence From Spain”. Eco-
nomics Letters, vol. 78 (1): 9-16.
Bulow, J. and Klemperer, P. (1996), “Auctions Versus Negotiations”. The American Economic Re-
view, 86(1): 180-194.
107 Can Governments signal commitment in privatization sales?Dewenter, K. L. and Malatesta, P. H. (1997), “Public Offerings of State-Owned and Privately-Owned
Enterprises: An International Comparison”. The Journal of Finance, 52(4): 1.659-1.679.
Drukker, D. M. (2003), “Testing for Serial Correlation in Linear Panel-Data Models.” Stata Journal,
vol. 3 (2): 168-177.
Ernst & Young (1994), Privatization. Investing in State-Owned Enterprises Around the World. (New
York: John Wiley & sons).
Florio, M. and Manzoni, K. (2004), “Abnormal Returns of UK Privatizations: from Underpricing to
Outperformance”. Applied Economics, vol. 36: 119-136.
Gruber, H. and Verboven, F. (2001), “The Diffusion of Mobile Telecommunications Services in the
European Union”. European Economic Review, vol. 45 (3):577-588.
Gruber, H. and Verboven, F. (2001a), “The Evolution of markets under entry and standards regulation-
the case of global mobile telecommunications”. International Journal of Industrial Organization,
vol. 19 (7): 1.189-1.212.
Hausman, J. A. (1978), “Specification Tests in Econometrics”. Econometrica, 46(6): 1.251-1.271.
Hausman, J. (1983), Specification and Estimation of Simultaneous Equations Models. (In Z. Griliches
& M.D. Intriligator (Eds.), Handbook of Econometrics Vol. 1, Amsterdam: North Holland).
Hills, A. and Yeh, H. Y. (1999), “Spectrum Use and Carrier Costs: A Critical Trade-off.” Telecommu-
nications Policy, 23: 569-584.
Jones, L. S.; Megginson, W. L.; Nash, R. C. and Netter, J. M. (1999), “Share Issue Privatizations as Fi-
nancial Means to Political and Economic Ends”. Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 53: 217-253.
Levitt, S. D. (1994), “Using Repeat Challengers to Estimate the Effect of Campaign Spending on Elec-
tion Outcomes in the US. House”. The Journal of Political Economy, vol. 102 (4): 777-798.
Perotti, E. (1995), “Credible Privatization”. The American Economic Review, vol. 85. (4): 847-859.
Perotti, E. and Guney, S. E. (1993), “The Structure of Privatization Plans”. Financial Management,
vol. 22 (1): 84-98.
Perotti, E. C. and van Oijen, P. (2001), “Privatization, Political Risk and Stock Market Development
in Emerging Economies”. Journal of International Money and Finance, vol. 20 (1): 43-69.
Ramamurti, R. (1992), “Why are Developing Countries Privatizing?”. Journal of Internatinal Business
Studies, vol. 23 (2): 225-249.
Ramamurti, R. (1996), The New Frontier of Privatization. (In R. Ramamurti (Ed.), Privatizing Monop-
olies: Lessons From the Telecommunications and Transport Sectors in Latin America. (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press).
Reinhart, C. M.; Rogoff, K. S. and Savastano, M. A. (2003), “Debt Intolerance”. Brookings Papers on
Economic Activity, 2003(1): 1-74.
Selian, A. (2001), 3G Mobile Licensing Policy: From GSM to IMT-2000. A Comparative Analysis.
Manuscript. GSM Case Study. International Telecommunications Union. http://www.itu.int
108 BRUNO VIANISu, D. (2004), “Adverse-selection Versus Signaling: Evidence from the Pricing of Chinese IPOs.”
Journal of Economics and Business, vol. 56: 1-19.
Sung, N. and Lee, Y.-H. (2002), “Substitution Between Mobile and Fixed Telephone in Korea.” Re-
view of Industrial Organization, vol. 20 (4): 367-374.
Viani, B. E. (2007), “Monopoly rights in the privatization of telephone firms”. Public Choice, vol. 133
(1-2): 171-198.
Wallsten, S. J. (2004), “Privatizing Monopolies in Developing Countries: The Real Effect of Exclusiv-
ity Periods in Telecommunications”. Journal of Regulatory Economics, 26(3): 303-320.
Wooldridge, J. M. (2002), Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. (Cambridge: The
MIT Press).
World Bank (1995), Bureaucrats in Business. (New York: Oxford University Press).
Resumen
La literatura sobre privatizaciones graduales sugiere que los gobiernos pueden enviar señales creíbles
a los inversionistas de un compromiso de no expropiar las ganancias de las empresas privatizadas. La
privatización de las empresas estatales de teléfonos alrededor del mundo proporciona una excelente
oportunidad para poner a prueba dicha teoría. Usando una muestra de transacciones repetidas se puso
a prueba la efectividad de los gobiernos para enviar señales creíbles a los inversionista de un compro-
miso de no expropiación mediante la venta gradual y la transferencia del control de la empresa de ma-
nera inmediata. Mediante el uso de regresiones de efectos fijos con datos de panel se obtuvieron esti-
mados consistentes cuando el compromiso de no expropiar es imposible de observar debido a que este
es constante en el tiempo. Se aseguró un compromiso de no expropiación constante debido al uso de
ventas repetidas de la misma empresa efectuadas por la misma administración gubernamental, típica-
mente dentro de un periodo de dos años. Los resultados ponen en duda la habilidad de los gobiernos
para enviar señales creíbles de un compromiso de no expropiación y efectivamente aumentar el valor
de las empresas en las privatizaciones. Los resultados son robustos para varias señales probadas.
Palabras clave: Privatización, expropiación, señal, telecomunicaciones.
Clasificaci￳n JEL: D7, D8, G12, L33
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